On the 15th of December 1995 Belgian footballer Jean Marc Bosman stood in front of the European Court of Justice, awaiting a ruling that was to change the face of professional football forever.
This case had been brought to court after Bosman had attempted to join French club Dunkerque in 1990 after his contract with RFC Liege had expired. Liege would only release Bosman’s registration when their valuation of £500,000 was met, so when Dunkerque refused to co-operate the move broke down and Bosman decided to open legal proceedings citing improper treatment. In retaliation Liège cut Bosman’s wages by 75% and placed him on suspension until he signed a new deal, invoking a standoff that would linger on for the next five years.
What complicated this matter was that three civil suits ran concurrently, one with his former employer RFC Liege, one with the Belgian FA and another with UEFA. During this prolonged litigation process Bosman’s career all but stalled, making only fleeting appearances on loan at Ligue 2 side Saint-Quentin and a short spell on the Indian Ocean Island of Reunion.
When the court finally ruled that Bosman had been treated unfairly the sums of money given in compensation did little to remunerate a career that had been financially decimated, however the landmark decision would lead to a total transformation of the governance over footballer’s contracts.
The laws pertaining to freedom of movement gave players greater bargaining power over salaries and contract length within the EU, however where UEFA became embroiled was in their competition rules that limited the number of players they quantified as foreign.
The court ruled their much maligned 3+2 rule was in breach of EU employment law and from that point forward it would be abolished. This caused a slight problem for UEFA, in so much as they were halfway through their current competition calendar.
In a piece in the Independent on Saturday 16th December 1995, Guy Hodgson reported:
Amid the general dismay over the wholescale changes in football’s transfer system, the silver lining yesterday was the abolition of the three-foreigner rule in the European club competitions.
British teams have suffered this restriction more than others because England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are regarded as separate countries by UEFA. Partly as a consequence, British clubs have won only one European trophy since its introduction, the Cup-Winners’ Cup in 1994, by Arsenal, and Rangers, Manchester United and Blackburn Rovers have all failed to get beyond the early stages of the European Cup in the last three years.
Rangers have been lobbying for a change in the three-foreigner rule for several years and yesterday the club’s vice-chairman, Donald Findlay QC, welcomed its scrapping by the European Court of Justice. “We are delighted with the verdict,” he said. “It means that our foreign players are now just Rangers players, pure and simple, and are available for every game.”
In classic UEFA fashion their first move was to circle all the participating clubs left in the three European Cup competitions and lobbied that they see the current 3+2 rules through to the end of the season. The clubs duly obliged, however this didn’t stop those around the game having their say.
One such dissenting voice who rarely missed an opportunity to have his say was Alex Ferguson, who when questioned about the results of the court case said:
“It’s come two years late for us,” he said, “because we’d have had a chance of winning the European Cup in 1994 otherwise.”
There is little doubt that these rules affected United’s ability to compete on the European level, especially given the first team regularly featured Peter Schmeical (Denmark), Eric Cantona (France) and Andrei Kanchelskis (Russia), which on a surface level would have been fine, but when Dennis Irwin (Ireland), Mark Hughes (Wales), Ryan Giggs (Wales), and Roy Keane (Ireland) also count toward the same quota we begin to see where the problems lay.
Building a squad to win the premier league is one thing but doing so with the foresight of being equipped to challenge in Europe is another entirely. Blackburn Rovers are the cautionary tale from this period, a side that spent multiple millions of pounds recruiting England’s most up and coming talent that would deliver the Premier League trophy but was entirely ill-equipped to perform on the European stage. Their dismal performance in the 95/96 Champions League marked the slow decline of the club, with each passing summer their top talent departing for pastures new.
It was in the summer of 1995 Alex Ferguson embarked upon his first major remodeling of his United side since they had established themselves as champions of England. The departures of first team regulars Andrei Kanchelskis, Mark Hughes and Paul Ince was a shock to the fans system, as was their replacements arriving in the form of a group of youth team graduates.
It’s an interesting proposition to consider whether this group of budding youth players would have been fast tracked as quickly had United qualified for the Champions League that season, however Ferguson’s faith in this band of brothers, in some cases literally, would ultimately pay dividends for both club and country.
Fast forward to the summer of 1998 and Arsenal had tread an altogether different path. The start of Wenger’s reign at Arsenal had also undergone a transformation in the playing squad, one that would take full advantage the boom in post Bosman player movement, but was also funded by the increase in Sky Television revenue being enjoyed across the Premier League.
Between July of 1997 and January of 1999 Arsenal would release several high profile British players and in turn replaced them with 14 players of EU, African or South American descent. This expedited overhaul was clearly an effort to reduce the average age of an older squad, but it also spoke to the increase in cost to recruit British players in their prime while their foreign counterparts were markedly less expensive.
Manchester United 98/99 Squad
United’s squad was built in stark contrast to Arsenal, with only 9 of their 25-man squad born out with the UK and Ireland. Since the summer of 95 Ferguson had slowly augmented the core of a side who had experienced domestic success, but also had the familiarity of several European campaigns under their belt.
Peter Schmeichel, Dennis Irwin, Roy Keane, Ryan Giggs and Andy Cole were now mainstays in the United side, having served Ferguson well throughout many of the League Championship winning sides earlier in the decade.
Ferguson’s faith in promoting those from the class of 92 had absolutely paid off, with the Neville brothers, David Beckham, Nicky Butt and Paul Scholes all forming a critical part of the side.
Teddy Sheringham, Ronny Johnsen, Jordi Cruyff, Ole Gunnar Solksjaer and Henning Berg represented recent additions that were made in the post Bosman era and were now fully integrated into the side.
Ferguson would make several significant signings during the summer of 1998, but perhaps the most prominent was the capture of Jaap Stam from PSV in a deal worth £10.75M. While the move had been made public for some time, the Dutch international would certainly whet the appetite of United fans with his stellar performances for Holland at that summer’s World Cup.
United’s second signing was long time target Jesper Blomqvist from Parma for a reported £4.4M. Ferguson had tracked the winger since his days with IFK Gotenburg, however lucrative moves to AC Milan and Parma thwarted any attempts made by United for his signature. When Parma manager Carlo Ancelotti was fired in May of 1998 the Swede decided it was time to move on, with Old Trafford his destination of choice.
Further additions to the first team included Wes Brown, Jonathan Greening and John Curtis, all of whom were players who had been on the fringes but were now deemed ready for the rigors of first team football.
Manchester United would take part in four pre-season matches ahead of the 98/99 campaign, starting with a 4-3 defeat away to Birmingham City. United would then head off on a three-match tour of Scandinavia, beginning with a 2–2 draw against Vålerenga of Norway. United finished the series with a comprehensive 6-0 win over Brøndby of Sweden and a 4-0 win over Brann of Denmark.
The FA Charity Shield
United would return to England to complete their pre-season preparations by competing in the 76th annual FA Charity Shield (now known as the Community Shield). A crowd of 67,342 was present at Wembley Stadium to see them take on champions Arsenal, in a match that would certainly give the winner the mental edge ahead of the new season.
The two had last met in the FA Charity Shield in 1993, when an Ian Wright stunner cancelled out Mark Hughes opener for United. This led to a penalty shoot-out which United would win 5-4.
Manchester United vs Arsenal Match Analysis
Starting Line Ups:
Entering his second full season in charge of Arsenal, Wenger’s line up was now far more in keeping with his vision for the club moving forward. Utilizing the strength and solidity of the famed “back 5”, the only adjustment to the defensive set up was Martin Keown taking a more prominent role in the team, moving in front of Steve Bould in the pecking order to partner Tony Adams in central defense.
The midfield four remained unchanged from what had played much of the 97/98 season, however the retirement of veteran David Platt perhaps put more pressure on Petit and Vieira to take part in this one, especially given the match was taking place less than a month after their World Cup Final win in Paris.
Ian Wright’s summer departure for West Ham United only solidified further that Nicolas Anelka was now Arsenal’s leading marksman, partnering Dennis Bergkamp in attack.
Wenger’s first summer signing, central defender Nelson Vivas, had only just signed for the club five days before the match, so would only make the substitutes bench. Arsenals other substitutes were Steve Bould, Stephen Hughes, Gilles Grimandi, Luis Boa Morte, Christopher Wreh and back up goalkeeper Alex Manninger.
Ferguson set up his United side in a familiar 4-4-2 formation, fielding a starting lineup that would be recognized by most as their strongest eleven.
Jaap Stam’s introduction into the back line would fill the void left by Gary Pallister, who had re-joined Middlesbrough in a deal worth £2M in July of 1998. Roy Keane’s return into central midfield following a 10-month injury lay off was welcome news for United fans, as the Irishman’s driving performances had been sadly missed throughout the 97/98 season.
It would appear this match came too soon for Jesper Blomqvist, who missed out on the match altogether. On the bench for United would be David May, Phil Neville, Henning Berg, Jordi Cryuff, Teddy Sheringham, Ole Gunnar Solskjaer and back up goalkeeper Nick Culkin.
First Half Tactical Analysis
Clash of Styles
While we are acutely aware of how Arsenal would evolve under Wenger into a high possession based team, it’s interesting to go back and see how at ease this particular side were in playing on the counter.
Let’s start by looking at how Arsenal defend, in particular in the central portion of the field. Arsenal’s back line of Dixon, Keown, Adams and Winterburn have lots of miles on the clock together, so their strength of understanding allowed them to defend as a unit without the need of a dedicated defensive midfielder. Vieira and Petit were given the freedom to press the ball or pick up the second ball should a United striker take a poor touch, all of which can be achieved by Arsenal’s defensive line using aggressive forward pressing movements and quick lateral coverage.
In these clips well see as United build the game forward Arsenal drop into their defensive 4-4-2 shape, standing off the play until United play an attacking forward pass. At this point one of the Arsenal back four will step out to press the ball receiver, with the remaining defenders covering behind and stepping up. These movements have all the hallmarks of George Graham’s tenure as manager, when the back line was drilled to step forward and catch opposition strikers offside should they stray forward too early.
United Build Pattern
Knowing that Adams and Keown like to step out of the Arsenal defensive line, Ferguson narrowed the top of his attack by pulling Giggs and Beckham into central positions. United’s attacking width would eventually come from Irwin and Neville who supported forward from deep once a United attacker secured possession.
Butt and Keane were very careful when building forward not to pass into a player who was directly marked or in a flat body position, the consequences of which would have played right into Arsenal’s desire to play on the counter.
Should Arsenal choose to drop off and remain in their two banks of four this would afford Giggs and Beckham more space in which to find penetrative passes into Scholes and Cole, who split their runs left and right to attack the blind side of Keown and Adams.
United Right Side Attacks
Another variation of United’s attack was to use the right flank to create scoring opportunities. Through the partnership of Gary Neville and David Beckham on the right wing, Ferguson had two players with the understanding and creativity to cause any side in world football a threat.
Here we see Neville picking the ball up in Arsenal’s half like a traditional midfield wide man, drawing pressure from Arsenal’s left winger Marc Overmars. Beckham moves back to support the space behind Neville like a full back, therefore should Neville be unable to deliver the ball Beckham is positioned in an interior space unmarked. From here Beckham has the freedom to switch play or deliver the ball into the final third.
During the video we can hear a constant dull jeering directed toward David Beckham, which was evident throughout the game. This was of course part of the reaction to his red card in England’s World Cup match with Argentina.
The Flying Dutchman
Marc Overmars’ integration into English football appeared almost seamless in the summer of 1997, so by this stage he had firmly established himself as one of the most dangerous attackers in the Premier League. While starting from a base position as a left midfielder, Wenger would use Overmars as one of the primary targets through which Arsenal attack in transition. There is the simplicity of striking the ball into space for him to use his lightning pace to get on the end of, however Overmars also displayed the technical and tactical nous to play around pressure should he have to combine with teammates in tight spaces. It was obvious that United respected his threat as Ferguson ensured his runs were always picked up by a tracking defender in moments of transition, beyond this United’s players were also instructed to use tactical fouls should the situation warrant it.
It’s almost hard to assimilate a Wenger side who’s default strategy was to play long passes, however given the threat posed by Nicolas Anelka’s pace and movement Arsenal simply couldn’t avoid doing so. In the opening forty-five minutes Anelka lived on the shoulder of defender Ronny Johnsen, clearly identified as the weak link in United’s back line. Ferguson chose to limit the space Anelka had in behind by dropping his defensive line, however, should they get caught too high Schmeichel was instructed to protect the defensive third by rushing out to sweep up any through passes.
While this dealt with the ball inside the final third, the source of the initial pass often went unopposed due to the way Ferguson had positioned his attack. The combination of so many United players between Arsenal’s lines and a defensive line that sat deep, this culminated in an increase of the space in which Butt and Keane had to cover defensively. In moments of transition, they simply couldn’t get close enough to Petit and Vieira to prevent threatening entry passes for Anelka in the final third.
It was a ball intended for Anelka that led to the game’s opening goal, a pass which ended up with Bergkamp as Anelka shifted his run toward the penalty spot. A backheel from the Dutchman into the path of Anelka was thwarted by Johnsen, but his tackle fell into the stride of Overmars who smashed the ball into the roof of the net.
In these clips we also got a glimpse of how Bergkamp worked back to defend the space in front of Vieira and Petit, picking up second balls that led to the creation of counter attacks when Arsenal were in a static defending position. This particularly works well against a two-man midfield, given Bergkamp instantly becomes the spare man should the ball turn over as no one from the opposition defensive line can realistically step out to press him.
Keane & Vieira
While this clip isn’t part of the bigger tactical analysis, I felt it was an important part of the narrative that was building between the two sides. Three minutes into Roy Keane’s return and this ludicrously high tackle is intended to send a message to both Vieira and Arsenal, but also serves as the perfect distillation of a time when there was a far more liberal application of the rules.
Half Time Alterations
Arsenal were the only side to make a substitution at half time, with Christopher Wreh replacing Dennis Bergkamp as strike partner with Nicolas Anelka. United would wait until 53 minutes when Ole Gunnar Solskjaer would replace Nicky Butt, with Paul Scholes dropping back into midfield.
Second Half Tactical Analysis
Ferguson would adjust tactically by altering United’s build up play on the right-hand side. Beckham moved into a more natural position on the wing, stretching the space in United’s midfield line so Gary Neville could provide central penetrative passes from a deep yet narrow starting position. By encouraging Overmars off the wing to press Neville inside, this gave Beckham more space in which to combine with United’s attackers while exposing the space around Winterburn who stepped out of the back line with no natural cover.
A lot of United’s general possession play looked nice on the surface, but it lacked any qualitative outcome as their final pass or finishing touch continued to elude them. Ferguson’s final tactical tweak saw Giggs become the focal point of the attack, operating as a central number 10 behind the strikers. Giggs had the freedom to link centrally or move diagonally into wide areas, each with the function of creating opportunities for the strikers who were tasked with staying inside the box. The following clip is perhaps the most dangerous United looked during this period.
Arsenal’s general play in the second half was far more measured in possession, slowing the tempo down to draw United out before penetrating forward. Overmars continued to be a threat on the left wing, an area that gained specific focus as Gary Neville was on a yellow card and there was a lack of supporting players United were able to deploy in that area to provide coverage.
It was from an Overmars transition that Arsenal claimed their second goal of the match, a move which started with the Dutchman evading the pressure of Scholes and Neville to carry the ball into the United defensive third. Overmars was perhaps a shade unlucky not to receive a pass back from Anelka, with the Frenchman opting to turn inside and play a pass to Christopher Wreh instead. Schmeichel raced off his line and blocked the initial shot, but as the ball cannoned back to Wreh applied a controlled finish underneath Schmeichel and into an empty United net.
As Arsenal opened up a 2-0 lead Wenger changed shape to a 4-1-4-1, with Christopher Wreh moving to the right of midfield and Ray Parlour coming inside to partner Petit in central midfield. Vieira would drop deeper to screen the back line and offer more protection, while Anelka led the line on his own.
After a wonderful performance to open the season, on 67 minutes Marc Overmars would leave the field to rapturous applause as he was replaced by youth prospect Stephen Hughes. On 70 minutes Ferguson also rang the changes by replacing Ryan Giggs with Jordi Cruyff, Paul Scholes with Phil Neville, and Andy Cole with Teddy Sherringham, all in like for like positions.
Moments after United’s triple substitution Arsenal’s control of the game produced yet another goal, with a move that probed United’s midfield on two occasions before finding Vieira at the base of the center circle. A deft touch from the Frenchman found Parlour inside the United half, who kept the move flowing forward with an inch perfect pass with the outside of his boot that found Anelka in on goal. Despite getting tight, Jaap Stam was unable to block Anelka’s wicked left foot finish, a strike which flashed by Schmeichel who had attempted to close the angle by coming off his line. This goal put Arsenal 3-0 ahead and effectively ended the game as a contest.
Prior to the restart Wenger would remove Emmanuel Petit from the action, with Luis Boa Morte moving to the left wing and Stephen Hughes moving centrally. Steve Bould and Giles Grimandi were introduced soon after to complete Arsenal’s changes for the day, coming on to replace Tony Adams and Patrick Vieira respectively.
Throughout the closing stages of the match Arsenal’s impressive fitness levels gave United further cause for concern, with numerous lung bursting transitions almost extending their lead further.
Ferguson would only make one more change, taking off Roy Keane on 76 minutes with Henning Berg going to center back and Ronny Johnsen pushing forward into central midfield.
While the FA Charity Shield is a competitive occasion, it is ultimately viewed by those in the game as a final preparation ahead of the new season. In my evaluation the takeaways Ferguson and his staff would have poured over were as follows:
How can United better protect the back line in transition?
On too many occasions United simply weren’t set up to prevent counter attacks, giving Arsenal far too much time and space in which to carry the ball into the final third. Their attacking positioning had too much symmetry, which prevented Giggs or Beckham from sliding over to protect the weakside of the field. Keane and Butt had too much space to defend, especially with a back line that dropped off to protect the space in behind due to their lack of pace.
Can United’s strikers penetrate centrally when using this narrow system?
Quite often both United’s forwards were moving in support of the ball instead of in support of each other. While Scholes and Cole have the quality to work together, only on a few occasions in this match did they make complimentary moves that both pull the defense out of position and create penetrative lanes for the other to attack the space. Im unsure that Scholes works as a 2nd striker in a system that has a narrow supporting line underneath, especially given that he likes to drop and receive the ball to feet. In the opening exchanges too many players were showing for the ball versus moving to attack the space inside the box.
Who provides the width when building forward?
When Beckham and Giggs take up a narrow starting position, is there an opportunity for Neville and Irwin to start 10-15 yards higher and penetrate beyond their midfield partners? While the full backs were naturally more conservative in this game due to the threat Anelka and Overmars posed in transition, if Stam and Johnsen initiate more of the United build up play then Neville and Irwin could offer more natural width in attacking phases of play.
While there will undoubtedly be a part of Ferguson that was left quietly smoldering after the 3-0 defeat by Arsenal, he and his squad had little time to dwell on the disappointment with the start of their competitive games just round the corner.
In just three days’ time United would face off against Polish Champions ŁKS Łódź at Old Trafford in the first leg of the final qualifying round of the Champions League, closely followed by the visit of Leicester to Manchester in the opening match of the Premier League.
Join us next time as we assess a busy start to United’s season, featuring some high-profile matches, Ferguson’s next foray into the transfer market and a plot to take over the club that would result in the formation of Britain’s largest supporters trust.